## THEISM AND ILLUSION

The approach to a proper understanding of the theistic thought must be sought in the actual postulations of the seers who have in some measure enjoyed the Holy Presence. It will be admitted that the two great seers Sankara and Rāmānuja have diverged sufficiently in regard to the experiences of the Ultimate or the Absolute or the Brahman, and the theistic mind of both the saiva and vaisnava varieties has grasped at the truth of the Rāmānuja s state-ment rather than that of Śankara. The main bone of contention between the two can easily be said to be the theory of Maya or world-illusion or total illusion which the one denied and the other affirmed. The Māyā theory may be considered to be an off-shoot of the non-creationistic theory of Gaudapāda,(ajātavāda), a very legitimate conclusion trying to show that if the perfect being is to be, it cannot evolve or create or change, since such processes would impugn the perfection and eternity and reality of such an Existent. Philosophy, the Sānkhya System almost affirmed the absolute unchanging reality of the Purusa but explained the 'existence of the world as due to the'reflection'of Purusaa in prakrti, triguni, which because of its changing nature, makes the Purusa appear to be changing. We may in this context think of another thinker of highest repute. Plato, who admittedly affirmed an Unchanging Reality for the Idea, inferred by us through inductive inference and at higher stages by intuition into the essences of all things. This for him culminated in the grand Being which was the Good and the God, and the Archetype. The perceived universe was considered by him to be an imaginary world, that is to say, imaging the arche types in manifold ways in perishing things. The world of Matter, acts as the imperfect soiled mirror, a moddy pool, that reflects the One Supreme Arche-type, the Real, as many imperfect images. The parable of the Cave which illustrates this truth, hints subtly that so long as one gazes on the images one cannot know anything, but onco one reverses the gaze and seeks the conceptual or essential reality of these within oneself, then one may be in the very presence of the Ultimate. The theism of Plato consists in his placing God not in the outer imaginary universe, or universe of ideas, sans sense, but in accepting God who is the object of inference anrl deep vision, through pure thought that reaches vision. All inference in one saline is the pursuit of the reminiscence of the 'Idea".

In one sense essence and existence are strange contradictories. There cannot be any existence without essence, but there cannot be essences without existence.

Thus God should be considered to be an object that cannot be approached by the senses. On this issue every one agrees except perhaps the materialist. But whether God can ever be inferred or apprehended through the process of inferential intellect alone is the other question. Nyāya and Vaśeṣika schools try to prove God through inference. We also know how Śankara and Rāmānuja refute these arguments, and show that whilst we may infer a being who might be the creator of pots and other creations, we cannot apply the logic of our intellect to the

apprehension of the Creator of the entire Universe. Nor would inferences based on the ontological arguments, (that is, an idea, of the perfect involves its existence,) prove any thing except that there is such an idea in our mind, but cannot guarantee the actual, eternal, total cause, namely, God. In European Philosophy, this ontological argument was refuted by Kant, but it has always tried to recur in some form or other, as an intuition into the identity between Thought and Being, as in the Philosophy of Hegel and other idealists. But it was clear to both Sankara and Rāmānuja and their respective followers that God or the Highest Being cannot be proved by inference tied as this is to sense percoption. A question however arises: Are there references not so tied to sense-perception? Plato's view that induction will lead to the apprehension of the Deity Was however thus refuted. And no doubt Dr. S.Radhakrishnan wrote " The absolute as pure being ( Sankara) and absolute person (Rāmānuja), the intuitional and illtellectual representations of the one Supreme fact. (MIND 1926. p.153). We have to ask ourselves this question What is the one supreme fact of which these two are ropresentations? For, we are here shown by Dr. Radhakrishnan that the apprehensions of both intellect and intuition either reveal two contrary natures in a single substance, or that both of them are incapable of revealing to us the nature of that which stands like a Transcendent colossus which cannot be apprehended at all. In the former case, there is an acceptance of the anekānta-vādi without the possibility of declairing that these two representations exhaust the nature of the Supreme Fact, and in the latter case, both of them, even like the attempts of Plato, Udayana and others, have failed to prove the existence of God, the ultimate sub stance or Supreme fact No Wonder then that it is not intuition nor intellect to which Rāmānuja and Śankara appeal but to the sruti. The revelation of the Seers of ages past, whose words carry with them the solid experience of intimate reality, due to a capacity granted to them by the Supreme Itself. Thus the statement that the philosophies of Sankara and Rāmānuja are representations from the intuitive and intellectual plane respectively is not warranted at all. What Is very likely is that the organon of interpretation of texts by these two might have been largely restricted to the use of the intuitive and intellectual apparatuses of man, iind the divergences that have resulted might be referred to these differences in the use of the investigating and understanding apparatus. Inference in the Mimamsas subserves interpretation of texts and intuitions of seers. Sense has been substituted by scripture.

This raises very important questions. What are the rules of laws of intuition? and what are the laws of intellect? Are there no points of agreement between these two on major issues? Does intuition refute causality, multiplicity, relationship, particularity, perceptual and intellectual categories, whilst intellect, accepting all this, creates a fictional world? Is Reality a continuous stream of Spiritual Energy or a perfect unmoving, unchanging static intelligence? Is it matter that is static, or spirit that is passive? Does intellect crass-sect the flowing stream of consciousness of reality apprehended in perception or intuition of the perceptional level, or is it intuition that reveals the differences whilst intellect identifies all the categories and arrives at

the concept, the sāmānya or jāti, generality or species or idea, *jñanakāra*, universals, concrete or abstract?

So long as modern Indian Philosophers do not definitely take their stand on these issues, the interpretation of the ancient texts must for all time be confusing and turn out to be difficult. Tendencies of thinkers must be surveyed in respect of their standpoints and conclusions. It would not be enough to say taking the popular fallacy of general assent, vox populi, that intuition is what grants reality whereas intellect gives falsity. The intuitions too may give false conclusions if they are neither integral nor total nor vouchsafed by independent experience of others even when its own delivarences be autocratically authoritative for itself. And when the intuitions of such Philosophers like Śankara and Rāmānuja, Buddha and Mahāvira Jaina, Heraclitus and Parmanides, and Plato and Socrates differ radically as to the true nature of reality or the absolute experienced by them as supersensory and transcendent which somehow the perceptual and sensuous experiences affect or infect in a radical manner so alter its very nature, as to present a world of imagination, of imperfection, of evil, the modern philosopher finds himself in an unenviable difficult situation. No wonder then it is not the ordinary realistic thinker also who quarells so much as the idealistic intuitionist visionary for the former is atleast conscious of the possibility of his view being false.

Are then intuitionists subject to the environment whose opposition they represent? Do they give us an integral interpretation of reality or do they merely throw out wide suggestions of a reconstruction on lines that have not been properly presented by the then existing philosohies or religions, which it is their special vocation to emphasiae? such a vocation of a Śankara or Rāmānuja, Buddha or Mahavīra, Rāmākṛṣṇa or Vivekananda, not to speak of the great Seers and prophets of the West, would soothen our misunderstanding a wee-bit, but nothing more than that could be expected. For the major metaphysical issues would not have been answered, and is it not precisely the purpose of a philosopher neither gifted with the vision of the one nor of the other to synthesize laboriously those loose ends?

The present attemptis to show that at any rate, the Absolute of Advaita by all the descriptions that have been made answers to the highest of the Concepts. A philosophy of Absolute Reality entails a Philosophy of illusion, which then must he traced to its source The reason for this iliusion or degradation or perversion must be sought in the very nature of reality which it is the business of reality to unfold. It would be perhaps proper indeed if we did seek outside Reality a foreign power, an alien force, an archetypal illusion which opposes the good of God by the evil of its Evil. The truth of Truth the falsity of its falsehood, the beauty of the Beautiful by the ugliness of its ugliness. But it is seen that if Reality includes philosophically both sides, nothing can be outside Reality comprehensively considered. What then is illusion or illusionary power? What does it illude? and Whom?

There could certainly have been no more brilliant exponent of *vivarta-vāda*, than Śankara. No one could have shewn the actual content of experience to have been inferred with falcity, disunity, due to our very finite and truncated nature and activities. But, there is a suspicion that his *vivarta-vāda* had no sanction in the Veda or the Upanisads: that his Absolute is finally rationalised, though in itself an Absolute Experience it is identical with the most abstract product of philosophising; that evolution interpreted as *vivārta* cannot be evolution but emergence; and finally Māyā is not an illusory power except to one who is illused, but a real miraculous power of God, to display His utter transcendence<sup>1</sup>. It is the concretizing principle of Reality itself.

Further if the ultimate reference of Ether, Air, Fire, Water, Earth, Sun (Aditya) be Brahman, how could it happen that Māyā could have the power to be potent enough to shroud or veil or hinder it from manifesting, unless it be said that the Brahman, is the Absolute Concept or Idea which subsumes or sublates all the rest of the ideas of ether, air, fire. water, earth and Sun under it, even like the satta of Nyāya-logic? Thus the ultimate reference of everything to Brahman may happen directly because of the pantheistic assertion that it appears as such, or indirectly through the archetype or jñanakāra of those which in turn are imaged on the canvass of the temporal?

Can it not be likely that Sankara's meaning of evolution as an illusion (vivarta) was based on grounds of intellectualising rather than intuition? That this is a suggestion likely to be fruitful, though by no means acceptable to all, may be inferred from the fact -that no one has attempted to explain the subtle intellectual subterfuge which had taken the place of intuition, so that essence (idea) has been mistaken for existence<sup>3</sup> and essence was converted into an existence. Sankara clearly had seen

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Māyā means abundance. (l.i.13,14,15). Māyā in Bṛhaddevata is described as sorcety, magical power. II.43;VIII, 75&76; VVVII.86; crafty power VII.88 adbhuta Sakti; Māyāśabdo hyāṣcaryavcī; Paramapuruṣa sṛṣṭi : Srī Bhāṣya III. ii.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Śankara's Brahma-sutra-bhāsya: I.i.23.24.25 etc

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Śrī Bhasya: I.i.5 Māyāmātram tu kārtsnynena anabhivyakta svarūpatvāt. cf. Visnu Sahasranāma-Bhāsya: Parāsara Bhatta ( 12<sup>th</sup> century). Under name 303 Naika māyah: Gives the following quotations and observations.

<sup>1.</sup> Māyām tu Prakrtim vidyāt : Śvet Up.4.6-Anekārtha kriyākārinam prakrtu

<sup>2.</sup> Māya vayunam jñanam

<sup>3.</sup> Sānkhyatā deva Māyayā

<sup>4.</sup> Viśvānideva vayunāni vidvān it ca jñane(Īśa.18)

<sup>5.</sup> Tena Māyā sahasrām tat, śambarasyāśu - gāminā | Bālasya rakṣatā dehām, aikaikaśyena sūditam. Varāhe Purāne) ||

<sup>6.</sup> Megodayas Sāgarasannivrttur vindorvibhāgasphūritan ivayoḥ Vidyudvibhangogatam usnaraśmir vicitrāh prabhavanti Māyā

<sup>7.</sup> Aranyaparvāni Mārkandeyena vaṭadeļasayānādyāścaryam uktva, "Tato me prthivīpālavismeyas sumahān abhūt,

that the phenomenal World and the Isvara are actual existences and the actual being less than the non actual or ideal, he makes the assertion that God is less than the Abcolute and phenomenal world is an illusion, not indeed an illusion as between the Phenomena, themselves for which it appears to be real, but to one who has transcended the categories of existence. But there was the demand for the realization of the inwardness, the conceptual or ideality of the Absolute, and no category of existence according to him, even as in case of Plato, could give him that. The radical difference then between sense and thought, was transferred to that between existence and essence, phenomenal and the Absolute, <code>vyāhārika-satta pāramārthika sattā</code>. That existence was predicated of both can only mean that so far as Śankara was concerned the fact of actual knowledge of any one of them at any time granted to that reality. And thought and existence thus become synonymous

The radical difference that existed between the two spheres of sense and action, thought and reality or knowledge was made the pivotal principle of explanations. Between these two phases of the Absolute, one or which has been made or given the status of illusion, appeared a conflict that resulted in the affrrmation of God Himself as an illusion, undoubtedly real to the deluded but false to the enlightened. Dr. Radhakrishnan speaks of the duality of Sankara s standpoint which manifests itself as the Absolute and the Relative<sup>4</sup>. But this is not indeed relative to the Absolute, but relative to the relative entities of the phenomenal universe. We would be more than unjust if we followed the western philosophers in interpreting the Philosophy of Śankara, and affirm that what he did teach was an Absolute against the back ground of a relative universe. Rather what he did teach was the radical opposition and non-existence of the relative Universe, once the absolute was realized. When a man became identified with the Absolute and thus ceased to be, then the relative universe and all its Gods are nothing to it and finally are nothing. The illussion has passed off: This is nisprapancikaranam. The Self alone remains Absolute. The relativity theory would be inapplicable, and what might legitimately be affirmed is that the relative universe is relative because of its being related as a counter-pole of the Absolute, whose imagination it is. According to whatever metaphysical view be it idealistic or realistic, the realm of Being can only consist of features or factors ultimately pertaining to existence, though by no means utterly and in every sense void of essences: and the realm of being cannot be also dynamically actual. The real then as experienced by man through his vitality and senses is the world of space time and limitation or ignorance, and the Real as experienced through his thought and

Lokāndrstvā samastamsca, ityuktvān tarhi.....

<sup>8.</sup> Māyā is rendered as 'maternal measure', from ūma=to measure. Well might be rendered as Mother's activities where ya is a krit suffix. Cf. A.K.Coomaraswami

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> ibid.o.187. of Santayana's joke, "We are to be idealists only noth, north west or transcendentally; when the wind is southerly we are to remain realists".

knowledge and introspection is the turya, the truth free from all types of circumscribed fields or experience.

This would be correct. if the descriptions of the Upanisads and of the other scriptures of Brahman were confined to the inward vision and thought. On the contrary, the affirmation that Brahman is all this and all that exists beyond the sensor, makes it impossible for us to divide the spheres into those of reality and illusion. The mention of dark spheres (asuruā nāma lokāh) in the Upanisads lends clear justification for stating that all are real, and not that all that exist are unreal. The affirmation of an original Asat only intimately the ulter transcendence, the original causal oneness of the Divine over everything that we know of and does not affirm nihilism. There is a radical distinction between the nature of the individual and of the Supreme, it is because of that that Brahman participates completely and without exception in every existenc. Thus the Absolute is not a mere parsive spectator Consciousness but a caitanya, a personality. Despite the fact that Sankara attempted a dichotomous division of the scriptural texts, he could neither deny existence nor essence to Brahman. Pure Beingof Brahman had to be at once unchanging and eternal and unmodifiable, while yet controlling and sustaining and ordering the universe. The absolute had to be everywhere in everything as everything and yet be the pure Unqualified Being or Essence. The apprehension of a contradiction between these two sets of attributes resulted in the need to poslulate the principle of Iliusion which because of its double-edgedness can play the role of existence and essence to perfection.

Western thinkers like Hegal affirmed the dialectic of opposition as a solution of the problem. Whether this could be achieved in a logical way or not, whether it is necessary to affirm this in terms of the logio of perception or other sources of right knowledge were his next issues. He affirmed clearly that this is possible only to a certain extent.

The classic criticisms of Rāmānuja against the principle of Illusion are well-known, He asked the very pertinent question whom should illusion delude? (i) Is the illusion of Brahman *Svasmai*, for Himself or *Parasmai*, for others? If all are Himself then *parasmai* becomes *svasmai*, In any case, in ontological view the first operation precedes the second operation. (ii) If it is God's power that deludes, then God some purpose, which acts in such wise as to delude the egoistic beings but illuminates the inner being of the nonegoistic devotees. But if this principle is used as the power of deluding the perfect Being of knowledge, Brahman Himself, whose power is it? (iii) Can knowledge delude itself and permit delusion even though it may will these? If the nature of the Absolute is pure knowledge, how can it survive the illusion without being annihilated? (iv) If it has no beginning how can it have an end (v) If there is only One Absolute Real, and the souls are but reflections or imaginstions of the Absolute, how did they originate to become unreal? (vi) Is not the Māyā itself another entity, apart

from and distinguished radically from the Absolute, even like Evil from Good, Devil from God, Falsity from Truth?

We may see that these objections all stem out of an attempt at abstract monism but it is a radical dualism that has been exalted to the position of Monism. Monism to that end seeks to annul the existence of souls and all from metaphysical standpoint. All these attempts only reveal the endeavour of Advaita to intellectualise and thus to abolish or sublate or cancel the many through a recourse to generality having arrived at the final idea of Being, which because of its utter comprehensiveness posseses only the most general nature of having no nature at all; it asserts this too to be a product, not of hypostatization but of vision, anubhūti. The mystics claim priority to Experince of Vision. The mystic's effort is an effort to transcend all limitations, and it was perfectly clear to him that so long as the experience of the body as the need for action, and names and formn remained, there could never be fullest experience of liberty or freedom. Freedom from the limiting body is the aim of all mystics Vedantins, Jainas and Buddhists alike. Socrates and Pythagoreans also held the samevew. This craving results in mystical Solitariness, miscalled Oneness or undifferentiated identity, and it is this self same revulsion from sense and manyness and privateness that results in the ideal unitary universal Experience of the Abstract conceptuality, the Absolute.

For a theist, on the contrary, such a situation is an aberration, intellectually unjustifiable on the basis of the experience that we know of God, The religious consciousness rejects the solution of Māyā, though not of other worldliness or freedom from body.

In the words of one of the modern writers on the Pliilosophy of Essence, George Santayana, "Pure Being, when hypostatized into a substance is a metaphysical spectre, matter congealed, arrested, emptied and deprived of cosmic fertlity. ..Pure Being is not an existence or power, therefore not a God of theism or pantheism". Truly therefore also does Śankara refuse the name of Īśvara to his formless, qualitiless, nirguṇa, Being, which he does not speak of as utter transcendent but utterly other and as such "not this, not this" *neti, neti, neti, which* we know in and through any pramaṇa. Buddhistic thought when it affirmed the Śūnyatā did some such thing when it revealed that the *neti, neti, is* something very identical with non-existent itself.

But it found in it transcendence over circular or repetitive process. The categories and qualities of our exporience are alien to that state or Bhāva or Being. Nothing could be more remote to the Theistic mind than to offer a glorified Concept, however much one might attribute to it peace and glory and eternity. Buddhistic psychology that reasoned and reasoned and thought and thought, finally discovered in every concept of existence an inner contradiction which impelled it to deny to them

any ultimate reality, till finally it discovered that all that exists is self-contradictory. Equally the logic of finite experience collapsed in the school of Gaudapāda and Śankara. But Śankara with more vision and clarity of perception found the immanent existence of a permanent, abiding character, indescribable and transcendent to everything that we know, of which the whole list of existence is a pale shadow, a delirium, an error, a diversion and a mirage. The Inner seer was thus discovered as the central core of Reality, but the attributes, the negations and the character of this ātman, made it impossible for it to be a God. The Self was discovered but God was abandoned. It may be correct mystically to say as M. Romain Rolland says "I do not believe in one personal God..-. But I belisve that in all that exists including joy and sorrow and with them all forms of life in mankind, and in men and in the universe, the only God is He who is in perpetual birth." And again I do not need to enclose God within the bounds of a previleged man in order to admit that the Divine dwells within the soul and that the soul dwells in everything "

The intellectualistic attempt then is at the back of the discovery of the absolute. The process of discovering this Absolute is not very much different from that of the Socrtean effort of induction which discovered the being or the Naiyāyika effort to find the Sāmānya, the widest possible generality. But then how can we explain the existence of the particulars vises as , if the God that is alleged to have created the universe is a figment of imagination or a postulation by the souls of an adorable object? Sankara on the one hand is committed to the logical Absolute, the concept void of qualitative and quantitative content, or the common denominator of all content, but on the other hand, Sankara recognizes the infinite quality or aesthetic fulfilment of Union or Identity with the Divine, which verily absorbs the individuals absolutely into it. The separation from such a Being appears to be a veriest dream, even as some times our own miseries appear as dreams after they have been overcome or have passed away. By thus explaining the quality of the aesthetic and the logical Absolutes and by seeking to identify them whilst at the same time abjuring the world and its experiences as radically false and dream like illusions. Śankara has in reality revealed the principle of Māyā as the principle of mystical valuation. In other words, Māyā or the wonder of the universal appearance, which is the curtain on Spiritual life, deluding and revealing by turns the ignorant and the wise, is also the principle of manifestation of the Divine Self. The mystical aspirant sees the delusive Divine power and is afraid of it and thus runs away from it unable to stand the light, through intellectual prepararion, and solid hypostatization to the realm of Pure essence: the religious seer on the other hand, seizes on the fact of mystery and sees in that the glory and greatness, aiśvarya-bala, tejas-vīrya, jñana and śakti of the Divine playing in an infinity of planes and sustaining them through His existence and reality and delight, saccidananda. Reality appears as Iila, the play of grace and love. This consciousness and knowledge vision of the nature of the Divine comes to the religious seeker through devotion.

A belief in the rationality of the universe, however unintelligible to the intellect or even tointuition, as it appears in the case of Śankara and other mystics, is the very basis of all investigation and criticism. Though we may not prefer to assert, as some critics do against illusionists and nihilists, that their own systems and views and ideas are also illusory or non-existent yet it appears that there is real truth in that assertion.

Our struggle is real in this universe. The facts of our bondage and our consciousness of it are also facts of capital importance. The need for crossing over the turmoils of life, tortures of bondage, and limitations ol intelligence are decisively clear. The promise of the illusion-theory is that these are all unreal, and that one should discover the inner Being, the Self of transcendent light, wllich is ever shining in our hearts. This metaphysical reality of the Self in us does one thing, it somehow grants us that strength of possession already of that which has to be attained, and as it were, shows out a suggestion that untruths and falsities and illusions are more easily got rid of rather than real obstacles. How far this face-saving illusion is helpful in this direction, one cannot say, but it does promise hope, for a psychological outlook that makes life liveable under such conditions and hastens the preparation for realisation. Its value must be considered however not metapysically but psychologically, for we have shown that metaphysically it is not quite an explanation. And as for the other assertion of advaita of the One universal Spirit as the underlying fact and Reality of all things, that is certainly not denied by any religious seer; On the contrary the religious seer makes God the One Supreme Fact, and matter of all and establishes a brotherhood of all souls. Such a God would be truly Superpersonal, atimānusa-vigraha. As Professor Tennant writes "Personality can be conceived as divested of conditions and limitations that are specifically human, and the resulting concept may been be relevant to the Deity without being exhaustive of the Divine nature. If no more than transcendence such as this is meant by 'super-personal', theism can appropriate that term. But if it connotes something essentially different from all that we mean by human personality, such as an agency that is non-volitional, non-purposive, and non-ethical, the expression becomes synonymous for 'impersonal', and must be rejected. For God as used in theism, is not a name for universal reason, ineffable being, or even for absolute morality or a tendency that makes for righteousness, but rather for a determinate spirit, who is an artist and a lover as well as a geometer. Theism professes to be based on indications apart from the satisfaction of religious experiences, that God stands in 'personal'relations with creatures which may literally be said to be partakers of the divine nature, in the sense that they possess the potency of indefinite advance in fellowship communion with Him.'5

Theism does not merely mean the belief in God. It means the acceptance of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY; Prof Tennant, Vol II p.167

God as intimately related to the individual soul in an infinite number of ways, as the truth of his existence, as the good of his life, as the beauty of his experience or In theism unlike as in Deism, where God is a transcendent Creator or originator who is utterly removed from any human relationship to the soul, there is reciprocal communion, on the side of the soul, dependence, submission, service, intelligent devotion, absolute consecration and on the side of the Divine, grace, power to help and the will to rescue, mastery and good government, increased activity and permission to communion and intimate relationship that is realised by the individual soul as the Unity, Identity, sāyujya, sarūpya and samatva in every respect except in regard to the Lord ship of cosmic Creation. It means the realisation of personality, freedom and love, Creatureliness remains as the fundamental differentia between the soul and the Divine, but this does not prevent equality of enjoyment in the intimacy of unity in freedom. No doubt some theists hold that equality of enjoyment will be a misnomer in so far as there is bound to be difference between the enjoyment of the Lord and the enjoyment of the dependant soul however free and intimate their relation. But this is clear that thrre is overwelling fullness of blissful experience, that has no touch or taste of the miserable and the sinful.

If then we accept the reality of the experience of Religion and the underlying truth of the mystical effort at a state of utter liberation, divorced from the fallacies of intellectuality and search after the Absolute Generality (Sāmānya) or Absolute Idea, or Absolute Essence (which is asserted quite inconsistently as Absolute Existence in a logical sense, then we can conclude that Maya is a wonderous power of the Lord,6 that this is unfortunately identified with illusion-causing function. It is a mystic valuation of the union or communion with the Supreme Object of mystico-religious Consciousness, God, the super-personal Creator and Master of all Existence, and as such Himself the Eternal Ground and Substance of all. The planal difference apprehended with such light makes the world and all that previously appeared in the other consciousnesses and conceptions as utterly valueless. So much so the dualism and the unspeakability of the nature of Maya are not to be considered to be anything other than the real wonders aghatana ghatanāśakti and it is in this sense that the concept of Lila had been added to explain the apparently diabolical nature of the world for the sinner and the ignorant, even like like wonderhouse created for Yudhisthara by the Divine craftsman Maya, that made Duryodhana and his kind suffer from illusion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> LIFE DIVINE; Sri Aurobindo, Vol I.P.174, "Maya is the power of the infinite consciousness to comprehend, contain in itself and measure out that is to say, to form for form is a delimitation-name and shape out of the vast illimitable truth of infinite existence. It is by Māyā that the static truth of essential being in which all is all without barrier of separative consciousness emerges the phenomenal being in which all is in each and each is in all for the play of existence with existence, consciousness with consciousness force with force, delight with delight...'

In the words of Nicolas Bardeyeav "There can he no greater error than to interpret mystical experience in terms of monistic metaphysics. Monism postulates Rationalizatian a mental process rather than experience.' " Monism is in all its